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ITALIAN MONETARY POLICY IN THE 198OS
In the course of the 1970s the Italian economy was severely 
destabilized by a series of external shocks, which also similarly 
affected other European economies. First, the end of the Bretton 
Woods era and the Dollar's departure from its gold parity, then 
the world inflation which the dollar devaluation probably unchained 
and the ensuing jump in oil and raw material prices made more 
violent.
Those external shocks put into a greater relief the structural 
inflation ever present in a fast developing country like Italy.
As a result, the Italian economy was absorbed into a vortex of 
devaluation, followed by inflation and further devaluation, which 
had hitherto been typical of Latin American countries. From that 
vortex, into which even the most developed countries were attracted 
for a short while, the Italian economy has not yet been able to 
emerge. In spite of Italy's membership of the European Monetary 
System, the deflation issuing from the core of that system has 
not spread to Italy. The Italian economy has switched into low 
gear for what concerns industrial production and GNP, but is
1)still enmeshed in a vicious circle of devaluation and inflation.
The present depressed situation of the world oil market and of 
other commodities markets, together with the already mentioned 
recession of GNP and industrial output have only managed to keep 
the growth rate of consumer prices within the bounds of 15-16%, 
which one has to compare with the 2-3% now prevailing in Germany 





























































































The possibility that a model of structural inflation be more 
appropriate in the interpretation of recent Italian economic histo­
ry must therefore be examined seriously. In spite of a deflation 
of GNP which is now in its third year, prices have kept growing 
at the mentioned rates.
A comparative analysis of structural inflation has been
carried out by the research department of the BCI and published
2 )in a recent issue of its bulletin. It used the 1975 input-output 
tables for the main European countries with the aim of isolating 
the inflationary push issuing from an external shock, its propa­
gation through the sectors of the economy, and its multiplication 
by means of indexing mechanisms available to protect labour and 
capital income, and by fiscal mechanisms introduced by govern­
ments. The end product of the analysis is the isolation of the 
external determinants of inflation and of the inflationary impact 
of income distribution changes.
The outcome of the mentioned study is the following:
1. The Italian productive structure has a greater content of 
intermediate imports than that of Germany, France and the U.K.
In addition, final demand is more oriented, in Italy, towards 
goods with a high import content. As a result Italy is more sensi­
tive than Germany, France and the U.K. to a change in the prices 
of imports.
The Italian economy is also the most sensitive to changes in 
the prices of raw materials, particularly oil and other energy 
products. And, in Italy alone in the sample, families' consumption 




























































































if we isolate the inflationary effect of a rise in energy prices, 
consumption prices and exports' prices are affected in Italy more 
than in the other countries of the sample. The only other case 
is Holland, where exports consist for a large part of energy 
products.
2. The inflationary potential of an exogenous rise in wages 
and salaries is smaller in Italy than in the other countries of the 
sample. In addition, the inflationary effect of a rise in wages 
and salaries on consumer prices is for Italy the lowest of the 
whole sample.
3. The opposite is true for the inflationary effect of 
rises in incomes other than labour, both for consumption and total 
demand. This is the highest of the whole European sample. The 
explanation can be found in the fact that in Italy the "self 
employed" represent a much higher share of total employment than 
elsewhere in developed Europe, and that they are as a result a 
much heavier component of "other incomes". In addition the in­
flationary impact of the service sector is, in Italy, much greater 
than in the other countries of the sample. The inflationary impact 
is particularly marked on the consumption deflator.
4. The inflationary impact of changes in social security 
charges is also highest in Italy, where such charges are the high­




























































































On the strength of their intersectoral analysis of inflation 
in Italy and other European countries, the economists of BCI 
advance an interpretation of the inflationary mechanism in Italy, 
which is worth summarizing, since I find it very hard to disprove. 
They say that higher social charges, higher imports of interme­
diate goods, and raw materials and a heavier tertiary sector with 
a higher inflationary potential, are the core of Italy's structural 
inflation. The main channel through which structural inflation 
operates in Italy is foreign trade. When raw material prices rise, 
production costs increase for most firms and the trade balance 
deteriorates, while imports remain unchanged in volume. The 
inflationary impact thus produced induces a widening of the in­
flation differentials between Italy and its competitors; exports 
tend, as a result, to contract, and the trade balance worsens. 
Inflation is further reinforced by the behaviour of entrepreneurs, 
who try to beat inflation by raising their own prices more than 
proportionately, as they expect a devaluation of the Lira. Pro­
duction costs are increased by the indexation of wages, which is 
ignited by the mentioned rises in prices. When inflation has taken 
place, it shifts output towards exports, and exports have a higher 
import content than domestic demand.
To this analysis I may add that capital movements, when a 
devaluation is feared, take place at a very high pace, usually 
taking the shape of underinvoicing and overinvoicing, and to a 





























































































We can thus say that a devaluation, operating on a structural 
background as the one sketched above, sows the seeds of the next 
one, with the impact on the inflation rate that everyone can ima­
gine .
Why Italy is so peculiarly structured has been the subject 
of many a study. One can underline, among the explanations avail­
able, the one which sees the new Italian inflationary bias as a 
result of the "industrialization from below" which has taken place 
in the last decade. As a result of the crisis in labour relations 
of the early seventies, which coincided with the floating of ex­
change rates and the oil crisis, Italy entered the new decade with 
a currency weakened by structural factors (heavy dependence on 
imported oil) and a crisis of confidence. The large corporations, 
both private and public, which had led Italy's growth before and 
after the Second World War, entered a crisis which is not complete­
ly resolved even now. Soaring labour costs (social security 
charges, in particular), a decline in large-firm productivity, 
and a rise in the protection of labour and in job security, induced 
a decline in large firms investments and a tendency to de-centralise 
production. After having built some of the largest plants in 
Europe, Italian industrialists switched back to the putting-out 
system. The decline in the exchange rate contributed to shift 
production from capital back to labour intensive goods.
A decade after, Italy exports proportionately more "early 
industrialization products" than it did in 1970. Exports are much 
less concentrated in a few firms, and production now takes place 




























































































colourful network which is usually referred to as the "black 
economy". Not unlike what has happened in the U.S., industrial 
production has moved South, especially to the South East and 
the Center of Italy. Italian industry is now a diffused phenomenon, 
taking place according to a mode which would have not surprised 
Adam Smith, but would have certainly surprised Giovanni Agnelli 
Senior, who built the largest car plant in Europe in 1938.
The crisis of large scale industry, and the rise and diffusion 
of small scale industry, in the 1970s, has produced most of the 
causes of the Italian structural inflation. The diffusion of in­
dustrial production has meant that the State's capacity to tax 
the new industrialists is greatly reduced. Equally difficult to 
tax are the millions of small retail traders who have sprung up 
everywhere and the millions of "self employed professionals" who 
have flourished to assist the small entrepreneur and the small 
trader. Italy's fiscal apparatus has been built on the expectation 
that, like in other developed countries, most of the employed po­
pulation would consist of dependent workers, who would pay taxes 
on the PAYE principle. As the country reverted to grassroot in­
dustrialization, a scissor mechanism began to operate. Government 
expenditures soared, as in every developed country, with the gene­
ralization of the Welfare State. But, unlike elsewhere, the 
receipts necessary to finance those expenditures could be extracted 
only from the unfortunate lot of the dependent workers, whose num­
bers were shrinking in relative terms. The network of the black 




























































































It used the welfare state, but paid nothing to defray its costs.
A government deficit of alarming size was the necessary result of 
the growing hiatus between the structure of expenditure, which 
followed the European pattern, and the structure of receipts, 
which was determined by the new socio-economic configuration 
induced by the domestic and foreign crisis of the early 1970s.
To finance the growing government deficit, the only way to 
induce the 40% of "other incomes" recipients to contribute was 
to offer them government debt, on terms which could be considered 
satisfactory, indeed appealing. This was done in the second half 
of the seventies and is still being done. Government debt carries 
a respectable coupon and is "exempt from all taxes, present and 
future" as the Government solemnly declares. But Italy's deficit 
could not be financed "in vacuo". It had to be done in a world 
where nominal interest rates were being pushed up to hitherto 
unattained heights by many factors, not least the concurrent 
growing deficit of the U.S. Government accounts. To the structural 
factors of the Italian inflation one had soon to add the growing 
weight of interest changes on total Government Debt, whose average 
life declined to reach the unprecedented level of less than one 
year.
Things were not made easier by the Italian decision to take 
part in the European Monetary System. The EMS did not include 
either the Dollar or Sterling, or the Swiss Franc, and those 
three currencies are the most common vehicles for foreign exchange
speculation, as they have behind them the most developed financial
3)




























































































Dollars or Sterling. Thus, when the U.K. and the U.S. initiated 
their monetary squeezes, as of 1979 and 1980, the Lira depreciated 
most heavily in terms of Dollars and Pounds, and the Lira-Dollar 
and Lira-Pound exchange rates were the only ones left to absorb 
all foreign exchange speculation. If one bears in mind the infla­
tionary potential of imports,especially of raw materials, which we 
have mentioned earlier, it becomes immediately clear that the im­
pact on the Italian economy had to be shattering indeed. Italy 
had to pay for imports in an over-valued currency and to sell its 
exports to countries with under-valued currencies.
To this, which one could already call the worst of all possible 
worlds, one has to add the political dimension. As of 1979 the 
Italian "grosse coalition" which included the Communists and which 
saw us through the cyclone of 1975-76, collapsed. A return to the 
Center Left followed, which could not take place in an atmosphere 
of recession and fiscal rigour. The Italian economic authorities 
chose instead to ride the tiger of the world boom of 1979-80 
at full speed, and nothing like a restrictive monetary policy was 
possible until late 1981. The Italian economy went out of step with 
the world economy and, as a result, massive foreign credits had to be 
obtained through the Euro-markets. In addition, to fill its yawn­
ing deficit to some extent, the Government had to resort to ad hoc 





























































































The foregoing paragraphs were deemed necessary in view of the 
foreign audience for which this paper is meant, who cannot be 
supposed to penetrate the socio-political maze within which Italian 
economic life takes place, and for which Italian monetary policy 
has to be designed. Before turning to an analysis of the latter, 
it is necessary to review shortly the transformation that the Ita­
lian financial system has undergone in the last decade and to 
compare it with the transformation Western financial systems have 
undergone in the same period.
It is useful to recall that financial activities, not unlike
4)
other economic activities, can be organised in markets or in firms. 
As it is by now clear to students of economic organisations, the 
firms' system is as much the antithesis of the market system as 
centralised planning, as it consists of a series of interactions 
among a hierarchically ordered chain of economic operators which 
replace the equivalent interactions which take place, on the market, 
among autonomous economic agents who express demand and supply and 
generate prices. The larger and less numerous firms are in the 
system, the smaller the number becomes of transactions that happen 
on the market place at actual prices.
A country's financial system can develop enhancing relatively 
more either the mode of markets or of firms. Since the war, 
national financial systems have witnessed the prevalence of firms 
over markets, although this has not been necessarily true of the 
international financial system, and even the internal trend may 




























































































can, however, be safely asserted that in most countries the post­
war period has been characterized by increasing concentration of 
financial transactions in the hands of fewer and larger firms.
This development goes against the forecast of Anglo-American 
financial theorists, who had expected, by the application of the 
Darwinian logic, the multiplication of agents to perform on the
market place the more numerous and complex functions required by
5)an ever developing society.
Financial development in most Western countries, however, 
seems to have followed the Opposite path, as more complex trans­
actions have been performed by larger, fewer, multidepartmental, 
firms, while the area left to markets has progressively 
shrunk. Things have not been exactly the same in other 
Western countries, however. In the countries where, in the inter­
war years, financial institutions had gone bankrupt, legislation 
was passed, in the same period, to deliberately reduce the role 
of markets, to foster concentration of financial institutions 
and Central Bank control, with the aim of safe-guarding depositors 
(or, at least, to appear to be doing so). In those countries, the 
post-war years have seen the development of the opposite trend, 
towards the unshackling of financial activity from control, and 
an increased role for markets. The prime example of this were 
the United States, where a convergence of different interests 
has favoured, particularly in the last decade, the movement towards 
decontrolling the financial system, in the naive hope, which is 




























































































will favour the de-concentration of sectors and the development 
of markets. Although the move towards lesser control has been 
more marked under the Reagan Administration, it must be recalled 
that the Carter Administration embraced, at the time of its in­
ception, a very similar philosophy, and that its actions (when 
they were not dictated by emergencies) were inspired by a belief 
in the need for freer and more efficient markets. As to Congress, 
it seemed for a long while to have become convinced of the prefera­
bility of "rules against discretion", although in the most recent 
period it appears to be shifting into reverse, under the pressure 
of unfavourable financial events.
In the countries where financial institutions have never been 
under a cloud of doubt as to solvency and efficiency, as in Great 
Britain, and especially in Germany, the process of integration of 
ever more complex financial functions in ever less numerous and 
larger financial institutions has continued unperturbed (except, 
for what concerns Britain, for the period of rampant neo-conserva­
tism in the early seventies, when the Central Bank, with the famous 
policy of "competition and credit controls" let a "hundred flowers 
blossom" only to be confronted, in a matter of two or three years, 
with the worst banking crisis this century, the "secondary banking 
crisis" of 1975) .
In fact, in spite of the clash between a more and more concen­
trated financial structure and the de-centralization wishes of 
governments and even Central Banks, in the U.K. as well as in the 




























































































market by large firms, who have occupied the space left free by
governments after the end of the War. In the early post-war
decades, large banks have been able to recover their role of
main sources of financial means for industry and trade, by getting
rid of the enormous holdings of Public Debt which they had accumu-
6)lated during the War. They were, in other words, able to concen­
trate on asset management, as plentiful liquidity could be obtained 
by the sale of Government Debt holdings. This phase came to an 
end around the middle sixties. It has been followed, especially 
in the U.S., by the phase of "liability management" when banks 
had to begin looking around for new financial "raw materials".
In this phase large banks have been penalized, in the U.S., by the 
legislation which prevents expansion across State boundaries and 
thus favours small banks which can have closer relationships with 
retail savings. In order to keep their market shares, American 
large banks have developed the C.D. market, and have expanded 
their foreign operations. This latter development consisted more 
of shifting ever increasing chunks of deposits to the Euro-dollar 
market, where small banks competition was almost impossible and 
where, as is known, no reserve requirements apply.
The whole huge growth of these two markets, the C.D. market, 
and the Euro-dollar market, seems to have been caused by the pecu­
liarities of U.S. banking legislation, which has been passed in the 
inter-war years and is aimed at favouring the financing of home- 
building, by forbidding the remuneration of deposits and by giving 
special privileges to thrift institutions which, in turn, financed 




























































































In addition, the American financial system's development in 
the last fifteen years has been profoundly affected by the trans­
formation of the U.S. from a low-inflation economy into a high- 
inflation one. The new reality of permanent inflation has radically 
changed the way in which firms and individuals organize their 
financial transactions. High inflation rates bring in their wake 
high nominal interest rates. It becomes consequently impossible 
to ignore the cost of idle balances and of alternative liquidity 
sources. The coincident electronic revolution has rendered this 
transformation more hectic and radical. The gist of the change is 
that economic agents now view themselves as being at the same time
borrowers and lenders. As Sir John Hicks had suggested fifty
7)years ago, all economic agents now have financial assets and 
financial liabilities. This applies to individuals as well as to 
business firms. Both categories borrow to finance purchases of 
everything except the most non-durable consumption goods and at 
the same time hold portfolios of interest-yielding financial assets. 
To exploit this new reality a myriad of new financial institutions 
have sprung up, especially because juridical impediments prevented 
banks from catering for the new needs of firms and individuals.
The core of these new intermediaries' activity consists in giving 
their clients the possibility of maintaining liquidity and access­
ibility over their financial resources, invested in bonds, primary 
commodity speculation, common stock, etc. Having no reserve 
requirements to observe, these new intermediaries could perform 




























































































All this was possible because of the "Common Law" approach, accord­
ing to which "all that is not expressly forbidden, is permissible", 
while the "Roman Law" tradition is, as is known, rather the opposite, 
that is to say, that what is permissible is expressly identified 
by the written law. In the case of the U.S., the Common Law 
and Roman Law traditions have coalesced and this allows the 
cognoscenti to play a "hide and seek" game with the law keepers 
which is very profitable, as the sanction can apply to new realities 
only ex-nunc, and by that time the able are somewhere else trying 
a new trick. Most of what has lately gone under the name of 
"financial innovation" originates from this juridical peculiarity. 
And to this juridical approach and to the possibilities it opens 
to the clever operator, must be attributed the ever increasing 
meaninglessness of American money supply statistics, and the 
accompanying lore of money supply measures. Similarly, we can 
attribute to this juridical approach, and to the progress in 
electronic transactions, the increase in the velocity of circula­
tion of bank deposits, with the accompanying problems of calculating 
interest accruals.
The state of flux in which financial transactions have lived 
in the U.S. in the past decade has been such that it has been 
authoritatively suggested that the "euthanasia of the saver" has 
been consummated and that we must now consider every financial agent 
as a "financial intermediary", accepting "in toto" Sir John Hicks' 




























































































monetary policy, may be in the future, even the near future, of 
the U.S. financial system, the spread between banks' lending rates 
and the yield on financial assets. The whole community of citizens 
is thus seen as engaged in a continuous activity of financial 
arbitrage. In this new world, where liability management has 
spread from large banks to every individual, the chances that 
authorities have of controlling traditionally defined monetary 
aggregates are seriously diminished. Of course, if banks will no 
more be able to rely on stable deposits, largely interest- 
inelastic, banking will become a higher risk sector. This will 
increase the need for bank supervision and make higher capital re­
quirements necessary for banks and other intermediaries.
How do other financial systems stand, vis-à-vis the revolution­
ary changes that are shaking the U.S. financial system so deeply?
It must be said that the trend to make of every citizen a little 
financial firm cannot be resisted in any country where interest 
rates attain high nominal levels. This having been the case in 
most other Western countries, their respective financial systems 
have shown a much greater resistance to change than the American 
one. Generally speaking, one can say that the high degree of 
concentration that characterizes Western banking has favoured the 
development of banks into financial supermarkets, and prevented 
the rise of alternative financial intermediaries. Where those 
existed, as in England, the typical British solution has been 




























































































vive in a formal independence which may nevertheless have more 
than a modicum of substance. The development of a large interna­
tional banking system, the Euro-dollar system, has, however, 
given large non-financial corporations a possibility to escape to 
some extent from the vice of national financial systems, thus in­
creasing the discrimination that exists between large and small 
firms vis-à-vis national monetary policy. By and large, however, 
national financial systems, in the main Western countries, do not 
seem to have caught the financial fever that has shocked the 
United States. The reduction of inflation rates, of course, 
with the ensuing reduction in nominal interest rates, favours the 
resilience of financial systems to "innovation" of the type that 
has taken place in America. Another missing feature is the be­
haviour of the authorities who have, in the rest of the West, 
shown a much cooler disposition towards de-control. Even the 
ultra-laissez-faire British government does not seem to worry 
about concentration in English banking, and its free trading spirit 
does not seem to be hurt by the increasing banking supervision 
exercised by the Bank of England and by its rather heavy doses 
of "moral suasion".
It is time now, after the brief and rather summary review 
of financial developments in the main Western markets, to go back 
to the Italian scene, and to concentrate on the Italian financial 
system and on the policies adopted by Italian monetary authorities




























































































The Italian financial system has been shaped around two 
primary needs: financing a State traditionally unable to fund its 
expenditures through taxation, and financing the investment ex­
penditures of an industry grown more as an offshoot of the State 
than as the result of "development from below". In the 
economic history of modern Italy large industrial corporations 
were assisted, often even created, by large banks, founded with 
the help of the State following the French and German models.
The idea of a money market separated from the capital market and 
from the Stock Exchange, remained, for the greater part of Italy's 
modern economic life, alive only in textbooks. What existed in 
reality was a financial structure based on the continuous inter­
vention of the State, and thoroughly removed from the practice of 
competition. Of course, when world depressions came, as in 
1907 and 1931, the collapse of large scale industry brought the 
financial system down, and the State had to intervene directly 
to rescue both.
After the crisis of the 1930s, the reconstruction of the 
financial system followed the French example. Large banks were 
directly taken over by the State, and Banking legislation was 
passed which was a strange mixture of Fascist corporatism and 
specialization principles. As was the case in the U.S., savings 
institutions were given preferential treatment and, again as in 
the U.S., the principle was established that banks could not hold the 




























































































supposed to finance industrial fixed investment and banks had 
to confine themselves to short-term credit. The Stock Exchange 
was kept alive but it was not supposed to acquire a pivotal role 
in the financial system.
In the course of the late 1940s and the 50s, the Italian 
financial system did not develop any new features. The decadence 
of the corporatist State meant that monetary policy became almost 
exclusively delegated to the Central Bank. Industry did not re­
quire much fixed investment, so the supply of short-term credit 
through normal banking channels was sufficient. The inflationary 
episode of the early post-war period cancelled the real value of 
State and private debt. Governments showed a new preference for 
almost balanced budgets.
Under the surface, however, things were moving. The ruling 
Christian Democratic Party, which felt it did not control the 
financial system, traditionally the preserve of "lay" parties, 
began to favour through legislation and the practice of govern­
ment, savings institutions, whose Directors were political ap­
pointees, to the detriment of large banks and especially of the 
Post Office Savings Bank, which had been established 50 years 
before on the French model and had grown to a very considerable 
size. The Savings Banks had smaller reserve requirements and an 
obvious competitive edge, as the Post Office Bank was ordered to limit 





























































































Thus, in the 1950s, a new network of financial institutions 
was created. In addition to it, the Government favoured, in 
the next decades, the growth of People's Cooperative Banks, which 
in spite of their rather totalitarian name, were the expression 
of local industrial and commercial interests. A veritable ple­
thora of those sprung up, together with small "rural banks" and 
"artisan banks". As a result of this trend, the Italian financial 
system looked, at the end of the 1970s, completely different from 
what it had looked in the early 1950s. The heavily dispersed 
plethora of small banks collected a very respectable chunk of 
deposits. Another large chunk was collected by "Public Law Banks", 
five large institutions whose directors are appointed by the 
Government or by local authorities. The traditional banking net­
work had seen its share of the market considerably reduced, even 
if it was still responsable for much of the financial assistance 
to industry.
And so, from having been one of the most concentrated banking 
systems in Europe, the Italian became one of the least concentrated 
ones. In addition to the system's "balkanisation", the Govern­
ment began to directly administer huge financial resources to 
industry and trade, through special programmes, aid to Southern 
industrialization, agricultural credit, export credit, etc.
Undoubtedly, a good part of the growth of small and highly 
local credit institutions can be attributed to the development 




























































































But Italy's institutional framework is not a bit similar to the 
one where grassroot financial development can take 
place in a healthy and durable fashion. Financial institutions, 
be they large or small, cannot go bankrupt except in extreme 
cases. In most cases they are absorbed by other banks, if they 
find themselves in difficulty, and both workers and depositors are 
completely safeguarded. We seem to live in a fool's paradise 
where success is private and failure is public.
Moreover, while the Italian financial structure was being 
reshaped following the requirements of political parties and grass- 
root industrialists, Italy was becoming more and more integrated 
into the world economy. Italian banks were large participants 
in the Euro-dollar market. The trade to GNP ratio kept increasing 
and even very small Italian industrial producers became involved 
in foreign trade. In other words, while the integration process 
went on very rapidly, the Italian financial system became less 
and less comparable to that of other large European countries.
We witnessed a contemporaneous move towards industrial liberaliza­
tion and financial autarky, of which extremely severe foreign 
exchange control was an essential part.
To make things even more complex, the Italian economic author­
ities' reliance on monetary policy as the prime instrument of 




























































































in the mid sixties, the Italian government began to move from 
balanced budgets to massive deficit spending, thus following the 
generalised Western trend. Government debt began to grow rapidly 
and it first had to be sold to banks, then to the public.
Italian monetary policy has thus had to operate under very 
peculiar constraints. A high rate of real integration of the 
economy into the world economy, making for very large and wildly 
oscillating balance of payments financing requirements; an 
almost complete autarky of the financial system, whose degree of 
balkanisation has been increasing all the time; an almost completely 
interest inelastic large share of total credit, directly and in­
directly administered by the State; the ever increasing Government 
deficit, with its counterpart of mounting Government debt. Final­
ly, but most important, the continuous effort by the political 
system to penetrate credit institutions culminated at the begin­
ning of the 1980s in an extremely violent attack on the independ­
ence and even on the personal liberty of central bankers, an 
episode which no self-esteeming Italian can recall without a 
feeling of personal humiliation.
To this list of constraints we can add the more general ones 
of Italy’s participation in the EMS and of the escalation in world 
interest rates.
Small wonder, therefore, if Italian monetary policy has, in 




























































































mainly on administrative measures, which have very little to do 
with free markets and freely formed prices. What Italian monetary 
policy has amounted to in recent years has been a rather rigid 
credit rationing system, closely supervised by the Central Bank, 
coupled with an almost complete internal inconvertibility of the 
Lira.
Of course, as in all cases of administrative control and 
rationing, black markets have sprung up, for foreign exchange 
as well as for credit. Their existence has managed to relieve to 
some extent the pressure on an economy as heavily integrated in 
the world economy as the Italian. The existence of black markets, 
however, saps in the long run the institutions of a civilized 
country, at their very roots, as the success of the law-breakers 
demoralizes the law-abiding citizens and the honest bureaucrats, and 
spreads corruption to every corner of the administrative institu­
tions .
It is thus understandable that the Italian monetary authorities 
have made a timid and quickly reversed move towards a return to 
the market system. They have, in June 1983, abolished credit 
rationing ceilings, but have hastily informed the credit institu­
tions about what levels of credit they want them to reach. They 
have thus tried to move from rationing to a free market, and 
ended up with "moral suasion".
Moral suasion is an old tradition of the Italian monetary 




























































































publicly affirmed his reliance on telephone calls to commercial 
bankers, rather than on Discount rate changes. Italian bank 
supervision legislation, and the presence of a Branch of the 
Central Bank in every province of Italy, have given moral suasion 
increased strength.
But, as we noted above, the Italian financial system has 
become, in the last decades, much more balkanised and greatly 
more heterogeneous than it was when Menichella could make his 
confident statements. The recent humiliation of the Central 
Bank has certainly diminished its credibility vis-à-vis the 
more unruly and better politically protected sections of the 
banking community. The risk exists, therefore, that moral suasion 
will too often end up in confrontation, which would destroy the 
very meaning of the term. It is then almost inevitable that some 
sort of "corset" be again imposed on the banking system.
The Italian monetary authorities have made, in recent years, 
another attempt to move the financial system back to markets.
This was when, approximately three years ago, the Central Bank 
announced that it would withdraw its support from the Government 
stock market. Government Debt would then be left free to find 
the price at which the market would absorb it. This measure, 
which brings the memory back to the end of the cheap money policies 
of Britain and the U.S. in the early fifties, has been and still 
is the subject of hot debates in Italy. Critics of the measure 
have advanced that letting the Government pay the full price of 




























































































for funds is almost completely interest-inelastic. Moreover, the 
withdrawal of Central Bank support usually means that lenders to 
the Government receive a more substantial reward for remaining 
liquid and this induces an upward shift of the whole term struct­
ure of interest rates, and a redistribution of income in favour 
of rentiers.
If we have to judge from the volume of Government debt issued 
before and after the Central Bank's withdrawal, it seems certain 
that the Government's profligacy does not seem to have decreased. 
The Central Bank may have kept its monetary base and money supply 
figures more tidy, but it is doubtful to everyone except the 
most naive monetarist that the impact of an extremely liquid 
public debt on inflation is analler than that of the equivalent 
amount of money. In addition, we may recall Sargent's considera­
tions on the inflationary impact of debt financing, as opposed to 
monetary financincr. Finally, we may note that money creation means 
that somebody ends up holding the baby , while with an extremely 
short-lived, well remunerated, and therefore liquid, Public Debt, 
nobody pays the liquidity premium, thus nobody ends up "holding 
the baby". Since we have long ago been taught that there are no 
free lunches, this only means that the day of reckoning is shifted 
to the next period, or indefinitely if the mechanism is not modi­
fied, and that the account are squared via a rate of inflation 
higher than what it would be otherwise.
The Italian Central Bank has also, through the statements 




























































































to step back from active participation in the short-term manage­
ment of the economy, to acquire a constitutional status of "warden 
of monetary stability" not unlike that accorded to the Deutsche 
Bundesbank by the Stability Act of 1966. This desire is understand­
able, especially in view of the dangers that a non-elected body 
encounters when making economic policy decisions that cannot put 
it above the fray. But the role to which the Italian Central Bank 
would like to see itself promoted would only be made possible by 
the passing of a Constitutional Bill similar to the German one 
we quoted. It is highly doubtful that a majority of two-thirds 
be found in Parliament for such a Law, which would put the Central 
Bank in a position as free as that of the Judiciary. An inflation­
ary episode as traumatic as the pre-war German one would probably 
be necessary to convince public opinion that monetary stability is 
one of the prerequisites of a Democratic State.
Why did I give the present paper its title? The reasons 
should appear more clearly at this point. Italy, in the post-var 
decades, has experienced mutually conflicting trends in its 
industrial and financial structures, and monetary policy seems to 
be in a quandary, torn as it is between the constraints to which 
it is subjected both internally and externally and the desire of 
monetary authorities to remain, at the same time, in the group of 
"organisiert Kapitalismus" countries which form the EMS, and the 
wish to get out of trouble by "letting the market look after" the 
problems which the growth of grassroot industry, trade, and banking 





























































































It is only fair, at this point, that I jump off the fence and 
take sides. I stand firmly on the side of "organisiert Kapitalis- 
mus" as practised in France, Germany (and England before Thatcher) 
and as practised in Italy until the 1960s. It is highly probable 
that European countries will be extremely pleased to possess a 
system of institutional controls as they have developed when the 
excesses of the international financial market and the frightful 
oscillations of American economic leadership will finally induce 
a major crisis. Unfortunately, almost unconsciously but never­
theless very substantially, Italy has moved away from the fold 
of major European countries. To maximise output and employment 
in the short run, we have deeply transformed our industrial and 
financial structures. Our control mechanisms, fashioned after the 
European models, have become woefully inadequate to cope with the 
new reality. Every effort ought to be devoted, rather than to find 
radical solutions that remain only slogans, to reconstruct a net­





























































































1. On the experience of vicious and virtuous circles, see
M. de Cecco "Vicious and Virtuous Circles in the 1920s and 
the 1970s", in BNL Quarterly Review, September 1983.
2. Banca Commerciale Italiana, "Tendenze Reali", n. 22,
January 1983.
3. On the EMS, the most up-to-date study available is
H. Ungerer, "The EMS: the Experience 1979-1982", published 
by the IMF in May 1983.
The adjustment problems of small European countries, with 
vicious circles and the EMS are examined in M. de Cecco 
(ed.), "International asjustment, the EMS and small European 
countries", Blackwell, 1983.
4. On this subject, see A.O. Hirschman's brilliant essay "Rival 
interpretations of Market Society", in JEL, December 1982.
5. What I defined as "the Darwinian approach" to financial de­
velopment, was made popular by Walther Bagehot. It has been 
recently proposed again by R.I. McKinnon in "Money and Capital 
in Economic Development", Washington, 1973, and by E.S. Shaw, 
in "Financial Deepening in Economic Development", New York, 
1973.
6. The structural transformation of financial markets since the 
war has been recently analysed by C.A.E. Goodhart, whose 
excellent paper, "Structural Changes in the Banking System 
and the Determination of the Stock of Money", presented to 
the Conference on 'Western European Priorities', held in 
Brussels in December 1982, I have kept constantly in mind 
while writing the present essay.






















































































































































































EUI ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT WORKING PAPERS
No. 1 : Jacques PELKMANS
No. 3 : Aldo RUSTICHINI
No. 9 : Manfred E. STREET
No. 10 : Kumaraswamy VELUPILLAI
No. 11 : Kumaraswamy VELUPILLAI
No. 12 : Kumaraswamy VELUPILLAI/ 
Guglielmo CHIODI
No. 22 : Don PATINKIN
No. 23 : Marcello DE CECCO
No. 24 : Marcello DE CECCO
No. 25 : Manfred E. STREET
No. 26 : Domenico Mario NUTI
No. 34. : Jean-Paul FITOUSSI
No. 35 : Richard M. GOODWIN/ 
Kumaraswamy7 VE LIT I LIAI
No. 4 6 : Alessandra VENTURINI
No. 47 : Richard A GOODWIN
No. 48 : J-P. FITOUSSI 
Daniel SZPIRO
No. 56 : Bere RUSTEM 
Kumaraswamy VELUPILLAI
No. 64 : Marcello DE CECCO
No. 65 : Giampaolo ROSSINI
The European Community and the Newly 
Industrialized Countries.
Seasonality in Eurodollar 
Interest Rates.
Essay on the Adequacy o f an Abstraction.
When Workers Save and Invest: Some Kaldorian 
Dynamics.
A Neo-Cambridge Model o f Income Distribution 
and Unemployment.
On Lindahl’s Theory o f Distribution.
Paul A. Samuelson and Monetary7 Theory7.
Inflation and Staictural Change in the Euro- 
Dollar Market.
The Vicious/Virtuous Circle Debate in the ’20s 
and the 70s.
Modelling, Managing and Monitoring Futures 
Trading: Frontiers o f Analytical Inquiry7.
Economic Crisis in Eastern Europe - Prospects 
and Repercussions.
Modem Macroeconomic Theory7 An Overview. 
Economic Systems and their Regulation.
Is the Bargaining Theory Still an Effective 
Framework o f Analysis for Strike Patterns 
in Europe?.
Schumpeter: the Man I Knew.
Politique de l’Emploi et Reduction de la Durée 
du Travail.
Preferences in Policy Optimization and 
Optimal Economie Policy.
Italian Monetary7 Policy7 in the 1980s.
Intraindustry Trade in Two Areas: Some .Aspects 
o f Trade Within and Outside a Custom Union.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
